Carlos Fernandez Muriano

Fuente: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holdout_problem#Argentina

 

Argentina

 

 

A similar dispute between Argentina and holdouts has been ongoing since at least the 2005 Argentine debt restructuring.^[3] Bondholders that accepted the 2005 swap (two out of three did so) saw the value of their bonds rise 90% by 2012,^[4] and these continued to rise strongly during 2013.^[5]
An August 2013 appeals court ruling in Argentina v. NML Capital, 12-1494, determined that holdouts should be repaid the full face value,^[6] but on highly unequal terms to the 93% who had accepted the 2005 and 2010 swaps at a 70%-75% discount.^[3] In October 2013 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision without comment. A second decision of the 2nd Circuit which prohibits payments to creditors who did accept the swap if holdouts are not paid was on appeal to the full panel as of October 2013. This case may also be appealed to the Supreme Court. Enforcement of the decisions is stayed pending a final Supreme Court decision.^[7] Courts in Belgium, France, and Germany have backed Argentina on the basis of the equal terms clause, however.^[8][9][10] The lack of legal certainty is U.S. courts prompted Argentine officials to propose placing the restructured bonds in question under Argentine law, while concurrently announcing a renewed bond swap offer.^[5]

The possibility that holdout creditors can attach future payments on restructured debt and receive better treatment than cooperating creditors distorts incentives and can derail efforts for a cooperative restructuring.^[3] It is likely to be of particular importance in cases in which the creditors are being asked to accept substantial debt and debt service reduction. However, it is unclear given the special circumstances of the Elliot case whether it will be broadly applicable to holdouts in other restructurings.^[11]